If the probability that a certain event A occurs depends on the occurrence of an event B, than we speak of a conditional probability. Mathematically we write:
P(A|B) [1]
In the context of probabilistic causation we could speak of a "cause" if the probability that A occurs in case of the occurrence of B is greater than in the absence of B, or:
P(A|B)>P(A|~B) [2]
This formula suggests the definition of a negative cause:
P(A|B)<P(A|~B) [3]
A negative cause should be understand as an event which prevents or reduces the likelihood that another event occurs.
In case of:
P(A|B)=P(A|~B) [4]
we cannot speak of a "cause" in a meaningful sense, and have to conclude that A and B are independent.
Saturday, September 6, 2014
Thursday, July 17, 2014
Philosophical notes
My personal philosophical believes have changed over the course of time, mostly as result of learning new philosophical concepts and studying the works of other philosophers. At this moment my philosophical "believes" can be summarized with: monism, non-cognitivism and indeterminism.
Monism
I am neither a physicalist, nor a idealist. But I also reject substance dualism, instead I subscribe to a form of neutral monism.
Why do I reject substance or cartesian dualism? If our world really consist of two separate substance, matter and mind, than how can matter and mind interact with each other? Any substance dualist should explore this issue for a plausible answer.
Both physicalism and idealism are types of substance monism, i.e. the world consist only of one substance. The difference between these positions, is that physicalists believe that only the physical world is real, while idealists believe that only the mind is real.
Neutral monism rejects both physicalism and idealism, and instead it considers matter and mind as different aspects of one and the same substance. Because matter and mind are aspects of the same substance, matter and mind are inherently connected.
The problem is that we are not (yet) able to study the substance directly, instead we can only observe its aspects. Modern science does a great job in describing the material or physical aspects of our world, and because of this modern science is highly valuable. However, the success of science led many physicalists to believe that because mind and matter are (obviously?) related, that consequently that mind is caused by matter.
Though this seems to make sense, there's a logical possibility (but not necessarily a truth) that the matter-mind relation is an example "correlation does not imply causation". If so physicalist attempts to explain mind or consciousness in purely material terms will fail.
Indeterminism
There are several types of determinism, the most popular ones are logical, theological and causal determinism. The first two types has been historically the most important ones, while causal determinism is currently the most important version of determinism.
Logical determinism
Logical determinism is based on the assumption that all statements are either true or false, including all statements concerning the future. However, if all statements about the future are either true or false, then logically the future is also determined. That we don't know whether the future, does not mean statements about the future have no truth value.
There is serious flaw in logical determinism, however. The fundamental flaw is the idea that statements are either true or false, in other words it relies upon a two-valued logic.
Suppose you know that I don't smoke, and have never done so. If you subsequently ask to me whether I have already stopped smoking, what should I answer? If I say "yes", then I would admit I have smoked in the past, which is, of course, false. But if I say "no", I would admit that I still smoke, which is also not true. Hence the statement "I have stopped smoking" is neither true or false, since in neither case it would make sense.
Evaluating statements using a two-valued logic is not always possible, multi-value logics (such as a three-valued logic) might be required. However, if we accept logics with other values than true and false, the basic premise of logical determinism is crushed. Though logical determinism cannot be proven, it does not mean that statements about the future can't be true or false.
A further challenge for logical determinists is how statements about the future can be true or false. Proponents of this branch of determinism can either propose eternalism or to causal determinism (see below). Eternalism is the ontological position that the past, present and future are real and exist "simultaneously". This might sounds weird, but think about a classic film role with consists of all pictures of a movie. When you watch a film, you'll see only one picture at a time, nevertheless the previous and next pictures are on the film while you watch the current picture.
We can imagine a film containing 3D pictures of the entire universe. In this view, we are actually watching a movie, and though we don't know the future it actually exists somewhere. This film containing the universe is known as the Block Universe. A problem for this view of time, is that we need to explain why we experience the passing of time.
The major alternative position for eternalism is presentism, that only the present has real existence. While eternalism or the block universe is incompatible with indeterminism, presentism is not since the future has yet to be "created". A third alternative is the growing block universe, the view that both the past and the present has real existence, but not the future. Personally I am inclined to this third position.
Theological determinism
The second type of determinism, theological determinism, states that the future has been determined by god. We can distinguish between two versions of this kind of determinism, transcendental and immanent theological determinism. In the first version god has designed the laws of the universe and created the initial configuration of the universe. Essentially this is a special kind of causal determinism, with god the ultimate cause.
A subtype of transcendental theological determinism would be that god created the world as a block universe, and hence theological determinism is reduced to a special kind of logical determinism.
Immanent theological determinism on the other hand require god's ongoing intervention to keep the universe in line with his plans. One version believed by some, is that god creates every moment in time separately. But if god does create each moment separately, then we can also imagine that god could be changing its plans all the time.
A problem with all forms of theological determinism is (1) that it it requires the existence of god, and (2) his willingness to determine the future. If god does not exist, then theological determinism is false. Also we can conceive that god would want to create an indeterministic universe.
Causal determinism
The third, and by far the most plausible type of determinism, is causal determinism. This brand of determinism arises from the following line of reasoning. If we know that A causes B, and B on its turn will cause C, then we know that C will happen once we now that A has or will occur. This is known as the causal chain: A > B > C. The underlining principle is that each effect is also the cause of other effects, and so on.
Causal determinism is not without criticism, however. First, CD requires that one particular set of causes, has only one particular set of effects. That is if A happens, than B will certainly happen. However, we can conceive that B can only if A happens, but that if A happens either B or C (with B and C two mutually exclusive sets of effects) can occur.
A possible alternative to "deterministic causation" is probabilistic causation, the concept that a cause will change the probability that a particular effect will happen. This goes along the line: it's unlikely that B will without A, but if A happens the occurrence of B will be likely. If probabilistic causation is true, then causal determinism is false.
An empirical argument against causal determinism, at least against its strongest version, is quantum mechanics. Unlike classical physics, QM events (such as radioactive decay) are expressed in probabilistic terms. There is, however, disagreement among physicists whether QM is inherently indeterministic or whether QM is simply incomplete (hidden variable theories). But at this moment evidence seems to indicate that those hidden variable theories are wrong, but new scientific discoveries could change this.
Non-cognitivism
My non-nognitivism covers three topics: theological, moral and "free will" non-cognitivism. I will save moral non-cognitivism for another post, because it falls out of line with the more or less metaphysical tone of this post and otherwise this post will become too long.
Theological non-cognitivism is the position that the term "god" is not properly defined, and hence one cannot make general statements regarding the existence of god. The point is that different people have different concepts of god. If one talks about god, what is his or her concept of god? We can only argue about a specific concept of god at a time.
Also a statement like "80% of the population believes in god", is meaningless. For instance, the christian concept of god (the trinity) contradicts the islamic concept of god (tawhid). And in hinduism, different sects has their own different concept of god.
There also many different concepts of what "free will" means. Hence arguing about free will in a general sense is meaningless. Required is a specific definition of free will. I will discuss several concepts of free will in the future.
The relation between free will and responsibility is a contentious one. Adherents of free will usually state that without free will, one cannot have [moral] responsibility. Certain philosophers such as John Locke have criticized the concept of free will as incoherent, and Locke instead argued that what matters for responsibility is whether one is capable of reflecting the consequences of his actions before acting. This is basically the line I take on this issue.
Monism
I am neither a physicalist, nor a idealist. But I also reject substance dualism, instead I subscribe to a form of neutral monism.
Why do I reject substance or cartesian dualism? If our world really consist of two separate substance, matter and mind, than how can matter and mind interact with each other? Any substance dualist should explore this issue for a plausible answer.
Both physicalism and idealism are types of substance monism, i.e. the world consist only of one substance. The difference between these positions, is that physicalists believe that only the physical world is real, while idealists believe that only the mind is real.
Neutral monism rejects both physicalism and idealism, and instead it considers matter and mind as different aspects of one and the same substance. Because matter and mind are aspects of the same substance, matter and mind are inherently connected.
The problem is that we are not (yet) able to study the substance directly, instead we can only observe its aspects. Modern science does a great job in describing the material or physical aspects of our world, and because of this modern science is highly valuable. However, the success of science led many physicalists to believe that because mind and matter are (obviously?) related, that consequently that mind is caused by matter.
Though this seems to make sense, there's a logical possibility (but not necessarily a truth) that the matter-mind relation is an example "correlation does not imply causation". If so physicalist attempts to explain mind or consciousness in purely material terms will fail.
Indeterminism
There are several types of determinism, the most popular ones are logical, theological and causal determinism. The first two types has been historically the most important ones, while causal determinism is currently the most important version of determinism.
Logical determinism
Logical determinism is based on the assumption that all statements are either true or false, including all statements concerning the future. However, if all statements about the future are either true or false, then logically the future is also determined. That we don't know whether the future, does not mean statements about the future have no truth value.
There is serious flaw in logical determinism, however. The fundamental flaw is the idea that statements are either true or false, in other words it relies upon a two-valued logic.
Suppose you know that I don't smoke, and have never done so. If you subsequently ask to me whether I have already stopped smoking, what should I answer? If I say "yes", then I would admit I have smoked in the past, which is, of course, false. But if I say "no", I would admit that I still smoke, which is also not true. Hence the statement "I have stopped smoking" is neither true or false, since in neither case it would make sense.
Evaluating statements using a two-valued logic is not always possible, multi-value logics (such as a three-valued logic) might be required. However, if we accept logics with other values than true and false, the basic premise of logical determinism is crushed. Though logical determinism cannot be proven, it does not mean that statements about the future can't be true or false.
A further challenge for logical determinists is how statements about the future can be true or false. Proponents of this branch of determinism can either propose eternalism or to causal determinism (see below). Eternalism is the ontological position that the past, present and future are real and exist "simultaneously". This might sounds weird, but think about a classic film role with consists of all pictures of a movie. When you watch a film, you'll see only one picture at a time, nevertheless the previous and next pictures are on the film while you watch the current picture.
We can imagine a film containing 3D pictures of the entire universe. In this view, we are actually watching a movie, and though we don't know the future it actually exists somewhere. This film containing the universe is known as the Block Universe. A problem for this view of time, is that we need to explain why we experience the passing of time.
The major alternative position for eternalism is presentism, that only the present has real existence. While eternalism or the block universe is incompatible with indeterminism, presentism is not since the future has yet to be "created". A third alternative is the growing block universe, the view that both the past and the present has real existence, but not the future. Personally I am inclined to this third position.
Theological determinism
The second type of determinism, theological determinism, states that the future has been determined by god. We can distinguish between two versions of this kind of determinism, transcendental and immanent theological determinism. In the first version god has designed the laws of the universe and created the initial configuration of the universe. Essentially this is a special kind of causal determinism, with god the ultimate cause.
A subtype of transcendental theological determinism would be that god created the world as a block universe, and hence theological determinism is reduced to a special kind of logical determinism.
Immanent theological determinism on the other hand require god's ongoing intervention to keep the universe in line with his plans. One version believed by some, is that god creates every moment in time separately. But if god does create each moment separately, then we can also imagine that god could be changing its plans all the time.
A problem with all forms of theological determinism is (1) that it it requires the existence of god, and (2) his willingness to determine the future. If god does not exist, then theological determinism is false. Also we can conceive that god would want to create an indeterministic universe.
Causal determinism
The third, and by far the most plausible type of determinism, is causal determinism. This brand of determinism arises from the following line of reasoning. If we know that A causes B, and B on its turn will cause C, then we know that C will happen once we now that A has or will occur. This is known as the causal chain: A > B > C. The underlining principle is that each effect is also the cause of other effects, and so on.
Causal determinism is not without criticism, however. First, CD requires that one particular set of causes, has only one particular set of effects. That is if A happens, than B will certainly happen. However, we can conceive that B can only if A happens, but that if A happens either B or C (with B and C two mutually exclusive sets of effects) can occur.
A possible alternative to "deterministic causation" is probabilistic causation, the concept that a cause will change the probability that a particular effect will happen. This goes along the line: it's unlikely that B will without A, but if A happens the occurrence of B will be likely. If probabilistic causation is true, then causal determinism is false.
An empirical argument against causal determinism, at least against its strongest version, is quantum mechanics. Unlike classical physics, QM events (such as radioactive decay) are expressed in probabilistic terms. There is, however, disagreement among physicists whether QM is inherently indeterministic or whether QM is simply incomplete (hidden variable theories). But at this moment evidence seems to indicate that those hidden variable theories are wrong, but new scientific discoveries could change this.
Non-cognitivism
My non-nognitivism covers three topics: theological, moral and "free will" non-cognitivism. I will save moral non-cognitivism for another post, because it falls out of line with the more or less metaphysical tone of this post and otherwise this post will become too long.
Theological non-cognitivism is the position that the term "god" is not properly defined, and hence one cannot make general statements regarding the existence of god. The point is that different people have different concepts of god. If one talks about god, what is his or her concept of god? We can only argue about a specific concept of god at a time.
Also a statement like "80% of the population believes in god", is meaningless. For instance, the christian concept of god (the trinity) contradicts the islamic concept of god (tawhid). And in hinduism, different sects has their own different concept of god.
There also many different concepts of what "free will" means. Hence arguing about free will in a general sense is meaningless. Required is a specific definition of free will. I will discuss several concepts of free will in the future.
The relation between free will and responsibility is a contentious one. Adherents of free will usually state that without free will, one cannot have [moral] responsibility. Certain philosophers such as John Locke have criticized the concept of free will as incoherent, and Locke instead argued that what matters for responsibility is whether one is capable of reflecting the consequences of his actions before acting. This is basically the line I take on this issue.
Tuesday, June 10, 2014
On Suicide
Many people are against other people committing suicide. Leaving purely religious arguments aside, why do many people actually oppose suicide? A common argument is that suicide is selfish. Though that might be true, but we can wonder whether those who oppose suicide are not selfish themselves?
It is my impression that many people are upset when one of their loved-ones put an end to his own life, but do not care much about when complete strangers are killing themselves. A more sophisticated version of the "Suicide is Selfish"-argument, points to the direct impact on others (for instance train suicides cause significant delays and hence economic damage). An ever more eloquent argument points to the loss for society: if someone commits suicide, then he cannot contribute to society anymore (whether this is through his tax money, or his actual activities).
The first version is clearly selfish: I do not want that my [substitute: child, friend, spouse, parent, sibling, ... ] to kill himself, because I do not want to grieve. So is the second: I do not want to be late at [substitute whatever you don't like to miss]. The third one might be classified as group selfishness, i.e. a group puts its own (collective) interests at the first place. An important question here is, of course, whether an individual is morally obliged to serve the interests of others. I place emphasis on moral, as opposed as respecting the interests of others only because of self-interest. This is quite irrelevant if one is about to kill himself.
It is my impression that many people are upset when one of their loved-ones put an end to his own life, but do not care much about when complete strangers are killing themselves. A more sophisticated version of the "Suicide is Selfish"-argument, points to the direct impact on others (for instance train suicides cause significant delays and hence economic damage). An ever more eloquent argument points to the loss for society: if someone commits suicide, then he cannot contribute to society anymore (whether this is through his tax money, or his actual activities).
The first version is clearly selfish: I do not want that my [substitute: child, friend, spouse, parent, sibling, ... ] to kill himself, because I do not want to grieve. So is the second: I do not want to be late at [substitute whatever you don't like to miss]. The third one might be classified as group selfishness, i.e. a group puts its own (collective) interests at the first place. An important question here is, of course, whether an individual is morally obliged to serve the interests of others. I place emphasis on moral, as opposed as respecting the interests of others only because of self-interest. This is quite irrelevant if one is about to kill himself.
Wednesday, May 7, 2014
Fascinating Future
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